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7 Media and identity: the paradox of
legitimacy and the making of
European citizens
sarah harrison and michael bruter
Ever since research on European public spheres has emerged in the
social science and communication literatures, it has rested on implicit
links with the question of European identity. With the crisis that
emerged since the beginning of the 2010s, questions on whether a Euro-
pean identity would be strong enough to allow the European Union
(EU) to survive through unprecedentedly turbulent waters became even
more topical. In turn, European public spheres have been perceived as
a cause, a consequence, or a symptom of European identity. Always,
however, public-sphere researchers have considered European identity
as the “bigger picture” that would bring citizens back into the equa-
tion. This chapter makes this implicit link somewhat more explicit and
provides a direct understanding of how citizens’ European identity is
potentially affected by news on Europe, thereby reflecting on the causal
links that “bring politics back in.”
Much of the research on European identity and the European public
spheres seems to have been built around a duality of assumptions that
is nothing short of paradoxical. First, many have assumed that Euro-
pean identity could emerge only under the condition that a European
public sphere in which European issues are debated exists. Second, any
criticism of European institutions and policies perceived as “Euroskep-
ticism” is assumed to potentially prove that the European identity
does not exist. Although neither assumption is intellectually obvious,
it seems to us that they are largely incompatible and, at face value,
the public-sphere condition seems more tenable than the “skepticism-
less” condition. Indeed, can a political system emerge without politi-
cal debate? Can a political community emerge without politicization
and political dissent? In this chapter, we support the argument that
although politicization is not without risk (see, e.g., Hooghe and Marks
2006), it may not be only a necessary cause but also a necessary con-
sequence of the emergence of a European identity. In other words,
we suggest that the more European people feel, the more that they
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appropriate debates on Europe, the more polarized they can become
about them, and the more politicized is their perception of “their” –
thereby appropriated – system. This contrasts with an older percep-
tion – still rife in much of the mass media – that citizens would be either
pro-European and like everything European as a result, or Euroskeptic
and hate everything European as a matter of principle. To support our
argument, we examine the findings of our research about the impact
of news on citizens’ levels of European identity using a three-wave,
two-and-a-half-years-long panel-study experiment that was run in six
EU member states. We begin this chapter by highlighting paradoxes
of EU legitimacy that point out the apparent compatibility between
Euroskepticism and European identity. We then analyze the results of
the panel-study design, which show how good and bad news on Europe
(and symbols of European integration) affect the identity of citizens
over time. We conclude the chapter by highlighting the dangerous but
necessary role of politicization in the creation of a political identity.
Down or up?
In June 2009, Europeans voted in the seventh direct European Parlia-
ment (EP) elections. On this occasion, the average turnout across the
entire EU reached a record low, previously set five years earlier in June
2004. Journalists and politicians alike deduced that the democratic
crisis of the EU therefore must be symmetrically reaching an all-time
high, and they hastened to conclude that Europeans are not interested
in the EU, that they do not trust their European institutions, and that
– by and large – they simply do not feel European. The starting point
of this argument was rather dubious in the first place. When we com-
pare the turnout in the twenty-five member states that voted in both
2004 and 2009, it was largely stable. Similarly, whereas the overall
European turnout seemed to dramatically decline between the 1999
and the 2004 elections, when comparing the fifteen old member states
that alone voted on both occasions, turnout had in fact increased.
In the context of studying the relationship between the emergence
of a European public sphere and that of a mass European identity, this
hasty interpretation of an apparently obvious public-opinion measure
(whereby we conveniently ignore that completely different countries
are voting in the three elections being compared) has a major symbolic
purpose. Journalists largely explain their lack of coverage of European
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news by the fact that EU citizens would not be interested. Conversely,
politicians explain the vastly domestic focus of their EP campaigns by
the suggestion that voters would be more interested in them than in
European issues. This contrasts with the fact that European Elections
Studies show repeatedly that a dominant and increasing proportion of
voters want to hear more about Europe (Van der Eijk and Franklin
1996) and that the French 2005 referendum on an EU constitution
witnessed – literally – several million citizens effectively reading the
incredibly obscure and long document and buying books that described
and interpreted its most minute details.
There is, therefore, a triangle of legitimacy crisis associating
citizens, the media, and the European project, whereby the media are
claiming to not be in a position to force citizens to be interested in
something that they do not like (Bain and Holland 2007) – let alone
influence them – whereas citizens are claiming that they are poorly
and inadequately informed about the EU. This apparently obscure
causality between the meager progress of a European public sphere
and the lack of democratic engagement of citizens could be sorted
out if we better understood the extent to which the media indeed can
influence the European identity of citizens by how they inform them
about Europe. After outlining the legitimacy paradox of the EU and
models of potential influence, this chapter provides the results of a
two-and-a-half-year-long panel-study experiment on the impact of
news on Europe on citizens’ identity.
Paradoxes of popular legitimacy
As discussed, the bulk of popular elite interpretations – from the mass
media to many political parties and to EU institutions themselves – is
that EU citizens do not feel European and that Euroskepticism is on
the rise and has led to a recent string of “no” votes in referenda on
EU questions. Moreover, turnout in EP elections allegedly continues
to decline1 and betrays a disaffection of citizens for a EU that is,
consequently, supposed to face a widespread and dangerous crisis of
legitimacy at the moment. In fact, a significant number of quality
academic publications accept this interpretation (Cederman 2001; Hix
2008).
1 However, this overall decline trend seems to have stopped with the 2014 Euro-
pean Parliament elections.
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Although not questioning the fact that European integration indeed
is facing a crisis of legitimacy in the sense that there is a mismatch
between public preferences in terms of European integration and what
is actually proposed to them by their elites, the assumption that this
must mean a rise in anti-EU sentiment and a lack of European iden-
tity of citizens is less than obvious. In fact, there are as many signs
pointing to an increase in general support for the European project,
civic engagement, and European identity as there are signs of dissat-
isfaction with specific aspects of integration. Our suggestion is that
European identity in fact is growing but that precisely because an
increasing number of EU citizens feel European, they now judge the
various policies and institutional reforms of the EU “from the inside,”
as citizens, and thus on their own merits rather than the principle of
integration. Therefore, we would not be witnessing a lack of European
identity and rise in Euroskepticism but instead an increasing Euro-
pean identity. We also would observe a reversal from an “outside”
Euroskepticism that targets the principles of integration to an “inside”
Euroskepticism. The latter takes for granted the principle of durable,
continuing integration but targets specific institutional processes, poli-
cies, and reforms in the same way it could happen in any other polity.
This would explain some of the paradoxical evolution in European
opinion.
As discussed previously, turnout between 1999 and 2004 among
the member states that voted on both occasions increased. Similarly,
the overall decline in turnout in EP elections since the 1970s seems in
no way sharper or more troublesome than the parallel participation
decline in the context of national-level elections in the same countries
(De´loye and Bruter 2007).
The argument that the recent victory of the “no” vote in a number
of referenda on questions relating to the EU simply would equate to a
popular expression of traditional Euroskepticism is equally weak. The
most emblematic of these “nos” – that of the French population in May
2005 – occurred at a time when support for European integration was
at its peak. Similarly, for the first time in the history of French referenda
on EU questions, the dominant argument of the “no” camp, regardless
of its (lack of) credibility was based not on a rejection of integration –
or a claim for slower integration – but instead on a claim for faster
and more generalized integration that would be increasingly social and
political.
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Finally, the question of popular legitimacy is difficult to disconnect
from the question of institutional trust. Again, the evolution of pub-
lic opinion when it comes to trust in EU institutions since the early
1980s is highly symptomatic. Twenty-five years ago, there was no EU
country where EU institutions were more trusted globally than their
national equivalent. By the mid-2000s, however, almost all of the old
member states and a large majority of the new states trusted the Euro-
pean Commission more than their national government and the EP
more than their national parliament (Tables 7.1 and 7.2). The only
exceptions tend to be Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Denmark (parlia-
ment only) and Finland (where the scores for national parliament and
the European Commission are tied). For those claiming widespread
Euroskepticism, this is a shocking truth. Who would think that in
thirteen of the fifteen old member states, including the United King-
dom, the European Commission is, in fact, significantly more trusted
than the national government? How can we reconcile these findings
with suspicion of declining popular legitimacy and never-emerging
identity?
The argument of this chapter, therefore, is that it is exceedingly
simplistic to start from the assumption that Europeans do not care
about the EU and do not feel European. It is equally wrong to assume
that because of this presumed lack of interest or, indeed, supposed lack
of European identity that powerless media would not be in a position
to participate in the strengthening of a European public sphere. We use
findings from a long-term panel-study experiment about the impact of
news on European identity to show that the media – far from simply
following the news demands of citizens – actually participate in shaping
their identity over time.
Methods
We use an experimental panel-study design instead of traditional
“one-shot” experiments.1 The sample includes 1,197 respondents
from six European countries: the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden. The two-and-a-half-year-long2 study
included two years of experimental treatment and a final six-month
“resting” period before the third questionnaire. The design respects
2 The study was conducted between 1999 and 2003.
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Table 7.1. Compared trust in the European Commission and national
government
Country
European
Commission
National
government Difference
Poland 49 7 +42
Italy 63 26 +37
Slovakia 54 17 +37
Belgium 63 34 +29
Hungary 58 31 +27
Slovenia 52 27 +25
France 52 29 +23
Ireland 61 39 +22
Portugal 56 34 +22
Germany 39 23 +16
Netherlands 54 39 +15
Lithuania 45 31 +14
Spain 53 42 +11
Czech Republic 35 25 +10
Greece 63 55 +8
Austria 47 39 +8
United Kingdom 26 19 +7
Luxembourg 66 61 +5
Latvia 32 28 +4
Denmark 47 44 +3
Malta 50 49 +1
Sweden 48 48 0
Finland 59 59 0
Estonia 44 45 −1
Cyprus 49 75 −26
Figures in the first two columns correspond to the proportion of citizens who tend
to trust the institution. Figures in the third column correspond to the trust advantage
(+) or disadvantage (−) of the European Commission when compared to the national
government.
Source: Compiled by the authors from Eurobarometer 61 (2004) data, Tables 4.1b
and 8.4.
two of the three main advantages of experiments: (1) knowing what
news participants are exposed to, and (2) being able to treat this news
as exogenous because it is not due to self-selection. However, it relaxes
the last traditional experimental assumption: obviously, respondents
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Table 7.2. Compared trust in the European Parliament and national
parliament
Country
European
Parliament
National
parliament Difference
Poland 53 8 +45
Slovakia 59 19 +40
Italy 68 32 +36
Hungary 64 29 +35
Slovenia 59 25 +34
Lithuania 52 19 +33
Belgium 64 38 +26
Czech Republic 44 18 +26
Ireland 64 40 +24
France 57 35 +22
Germany 51 29 +22
Portugal 58 37 +21
Spain 62 42 +20
Latvia 40 20 +20
Netherlands 57 43 +14
Estonia 49 35 +14
Luxembourg 67 56 +11
Malta 55 47 +8
Greece 70 63 +7
United Kingdom 30 25 +5
Finland 61 58 +3
Austria 43 41 +2
Sweden 55 58 −3
Denmark 55 63 −8
Cyprus 55 74 −19
Figures in the first two columns correspond to the proportion of citizens who tend
to trust the institution. Figures in the third column correspond to the trust advantage
(+) or disadvantage (−) of the European Commission when compared to the national
government.
Source: Compiled by the authors from Eurobarometer 61 (2004) data, Tables 4.1b
and 8.4.
were exposed to other news during the long experiment.3 To limit
this problem, respondents were randomly allocated into the four
3 In traditional “one-shot” experiments, however, this advantage is always lim-
ited to the very short time of the experiment, without prejudice to what the
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experimental groups and the sample used was as follows: (1)
larger (i.e., 1,197 respondents) than in much of the literature4; (2)
comparative, with respondents from six countries (i.e., the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Sweden); (3) sig-
nificantly more diverse than in many experiments in terms of geogra-
phy (i.e., at least four different regions per country), gender, age, and
socioprofessional categories5; and (4) begun at two different times –
two years apart6 – in each location. All of these safeguards are
intended to improve the validity and generalizability of the results.
For instance, many experiments (perfectly legitimately) rely on limited
locations (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Sanders and Norris 2005)
respondent might have heard, read, or seen just moments before and that may
still influence their attitude (a variation on some of the criticisms of Hov-
land 1959). Moreover, many recent web-based (rather than laboratory-based)
experiments such as those mentioned by Iyengar (2002) also have relaxed
this particular assumption while gaining in terms of sample size and design
quality.
4 There are obvious exceptions: for example, Sanders and Norris (2005) used an
N of 919 and quota sampling. However, most political science experiments use
a small N, between 25 and 250 respondents; for example, Iyengar, Peters, and
Kinder 1982; Wittmer 1992; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997.
5 The experiment did not aim to use a fully representative sample because this is
considered unnecessary in the literature. However, as it turned out, the sample –
recruited from professional quota lists – was highly varied in sociodemographic
terms. The gender balance is only slightly biased toward women: 58 percent and
42 percent men. The median age of the sample is 40, with a standard deviation of
16.8. The youngest respondent is 18 and the oldest is 89. The sample has a slight
over-representation of young people: 27.3 percent were younger than 25 years
old at the start of the experiment, 27 percent were between 25 and 39, 31.3 per-
cent were between 40 and 59, and the remaining 14.4 percent were 60 and older.
Geographical spread almost reflects census data, with all of the major regions
of the six countries included represented, and an almost fair representation of
communities of various sizes (with a slight bias toward larger cities). The rep-
resentation of the various socioeconomic categories also almost mirrors census
data but with an over-representation of students and wealthy social categories
and an under-representation of unemployed citizens.
6 The results of the experiments that began two years apart were fully similar;
that is, the variable corresponding to the starting year, included as a control,
has no statistically significant effect in any of the models tested. In addition to
the questionnaires, the study included focus groups on what participants meant
by Europe and European identity, their perception of the news they read, and
photographs they were shown in the newsletter. The discussion also dealt with
their perceptions of news on Europe in real life and EU symbols. They also were
invited to react to the experiment, which was conceived as part of the debriefing
exercise.
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or even student samples.7 By contrast, with our varied samples and
six-country comparison, we can verify that any experimental effect is
not an artifact of a microcosmic contextual reality. In other words, as
explained herein, whereas numbers are too low to draw firm conclu-
sions about comparative differences, similarities across very different
contexts strengthen the value of hypothetical findings by validating
them beyond context, as is traditional with most different systems
designs (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Przeworski and Teune 1970).
Similarly, the division of all experimental groups in each country into
two subgroups exposed to the experiment at two different times was
important to confirm that any observed effect would not be caused by
a systematic impact of the specific news on Europe in a given period,
particularly considering the six-month lag between the second and
third waves of the survey. Like countries and sociodemographic back-
ground, timing can be used as a control variable in all models – and
has no statistically significant impact in any of them, suggesting that
the effects we identify are general rather than context-specific.
Mostly, this panel-study design – although more costly and more
complex to organize than one-shot experiments – aimed to avoid
the risk of measuring short-term reactions. Instead, data measure the
answers of respondents (1) before the beginning of the experiment,
(2) after the end of the twenty-four-month experiment, and (3) six
months after the end of the experiment.8 This also made it possible
to distinguish between priming or sleeper effects in the causal links
highlighted by the experiment. (See a full discussion of priming and
sleeper-effect mechanisms in Bruter 2009 as well as references to the
works of Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. 2002 and Hovland, Lumsdaine, and
7 Sears 1986 criticized the dominant use of pure student samples (Nelson, Clawson,
and Oxley 1997).
8 There is no “exact science” behind either the twenty-four-month stimulus or the
six-month lag, but it is conceived as (1) sufficient time to develop a consistent
stimulus, and (2) comparable to uses in the literature. Indeed, Monroe (1978)
conceived a two-year period as a natural basis to expect citizens to fully absorb
economic information. Similarly, a six-month lag is rather traditional in panel
studies. For instance, it is often used in the National Election Study in the United
States (Markus 1982, in reference to the first two waves of the 1980 panel),
and the British Election Study (CREST 1998, in reference to the panel waves
between 1994 and 1997). It is also the “pivotal” lag used by Milavsky, Kessler,
et al. (1997), who tested multiple wave gaps in their study of television and
aggression.
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Sheffield 1949, among others.) Briefly, priming happens when expo-
sure to a given stimulus has an impact on subsequent perceptions
(Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. 2002) – for example, when buying a specific
car makes us notice the make more when we see another one on the
street. Priming heightens the sensitivity of human beings to a specific
stimulus over time, as if it provided a pair of infrared glasses that made
us see specific objects that would not have been visible otherwise. By
contrast, the sleeper effect is about an unusual effect of news that,
instead of being strong at first and then declining over time, is muted
or minored at first and then kicks in more strongly later. In other
words, instead of having an immediate effect of communication that
then progressively decays over more time elapses between exposure and
reaction measure, the sleeper effect works as if a given stimulus were
first “unripe” and ineffectual but, after a while, started acting strongly.
The experiment
After being randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups,
each respondent received a fortnightly newsletter for twenty-
four months. It was based on articles published in European daily and
weekly newspapers and illustrated with drawings and photographs.
The newsletter was four pages long. The first page focused on non-
European international news (the same for all respondents). The fourth
page included unusual news (again, the same for all respondents), such
as the story of a man facing a camel in his garden in Alaska or the latest
controversy on the real height of Mount Everest. The two intermedi-
ary pages represented the experimental stimulus per se. They included
news on Europe and the EU, which was systematically either posi-
tive or negative, depending on the experimental group. The choice
of positive or negative news respected a certain balance among eco-
nomic, political and institutional, social, and other news, and between
news on Europe and news on the EU.9 Details on the types of news
included are in Bruter (2009), but examples include an article on how
the euro had strengthened against the dollar, which illustrates the good
health of the EU economy (good news), or another article on how the
strong euro was disadvantaging European exports (bad news); how the
European manufacturer Airbus overtook the US Boeing Company as
9 An additional smaller control group was sent a newsletter without news on
Europe and without any photographs.
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the world’s leading manufacturer (good news), or how the A380 was
suffering further production delays (bad news); and how European
children had higher educational levels than their American counter-
parts (good news), or how they were less accomplished in math (bad
news).
In addition to text, each newsletter included three photographs or
(occasionally) drawings. Again, the respondents were divided orthog-
onally into two groups systematically exposed to one of two types of
photographs: either symbols of Europe and the EU (e.g., a map of
Europe, a European flag, or a passport) or placebo photographs (e.g.,
people and landscapes). The connotation of every item included in
the newsletters (i.e., positive, negative, international and other news,
and European and neutral photographs) was assessed blindly by three
coders. Only the elements unanimously coded by all three researchers
were used in the newsletters.
The questionnaires
The questionnaire was written in each language. It included two mea-
sures of general European identity, six measures of civic identity, and
four measures of cultural identity (Bruter 2009).10 The questionnaire
also included control variables measuring levels of national, regional,
and local identity, and – in the context of the pre-test questionnaire –
support for and perceived benefits of EU integration, as well as demo-
graphic and political control variables (e.g., age, gender, and party
preferences). The civic and cultural-identity variables were computed
using factor analysis, the results of which are shown in Table 7.3.
Countries and respondents
The study was conducted before the 2004 enlargement, when the EU
consisted of fifteen member states. The panel was conducted in six
member states. This was not so much to find differences among the
countries as it was to ensure the external validity of the experimen-
tal results across contexts. This is why our chapter does not discuss
10 The concepts of civic and cultural identities are defined and discussed fully in
Bruter (2005, 2009) and Bruter and Harrison (2012). Briefly, “civic identity”
can be defined as our identity as a citizen and relationship to our political system,
whereas “cultural identity” is a sense or higher relative closeness to people who
belong to the polity than to those who do not.
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Table 7.3. Exploratory factor analysis of civic and cultural components of
a European identity
Extraction
Component Eigenvalue % Variance
Cumulative%
variance
1 4.69 46.9 46.5
2 1.88 18.8 65.8
3 0.84 8.4 74.2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Component matrix
Unrotated solution Rotated solution
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
Civic 1 0.83 −0.29 0.88 0.05
Civic 2 0.82 −0.11 0.80 0.21
Civic 3 0.87 −0.26 0.90 0.09
Civic 4 0.84 0.02 0.77 0.33
Civic 5 0.76 −0.23 0.79 0.08
Civic 6 0.82 −0.24 0.85 0.09
Cultural 1 0.43 0.52 0.20 0.64
Cultural 2 0.20 0.75 −0.10 0.77
Cultural 3 0.44 0.50 0.22 0.63
Cultural 4 0.43 0.73 0.12 0.85
Notes: Results of an exploratory factor analysis of ten variables (six intended to
measure the civic component of European identity and four to measure the cultural
component). Results of the unrotated and rotated analyses are from using Varimax.
comparative univariate distributions but instead discusses the extent
to which causal relationships are upheld across countries. Given the
great variety of EU member states, even pre-2004, the study includes
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and Swe-
den. These countries represent various “ages” of European integra-
tion: that is, founding members (France, Germany, and Belgium);
and the 1973 (United Kingdom), 1986 (Portugal), and 1995 (Sweden)
enlargements – as well as East Germany within the German sample.11
This is important because some models (e.g., Bruter 2005; Hix 2005)
claim that when a country joined the EU has an impact on public
11 Tests of differences of causal results between the East and West German sub-
samples were run and proved insignificant.
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attitudes toward integration. Moreover, the countries chosen include
large (i.e., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and small
(i.e., Belgium, Sweden, and Portugal) member states because some
authors claim that small states have a different relationship to the EU
(Thorhallsson 2000). The study also includes countries that are tradi-
tionally pro-European (i.e., Belgium, France, Portugal, and Germany)
and Euroskeptic (i.e., the United Kingdom and Sweden). Finally, it
includes relatively rich and relatively poor states.12 In summary, we
maximized variance to provide the harshest possible test of the general
validity of the model.
The starting samples included approximately 200 respondents per
country, for a total of 1,197. The return rates over the three waves
were rather high for this type of study: 75.4 percent for wave 2 and
63.8 percent for wave 3, with no significant bias in the categories
dropping out, despite a minimal incentive (i.e., a book voucher of
about €3–4 [US$4–5], depending on the country). Return rates were
slightly lower in Portugal. Despite the limited drop-out rates, country-
specific analyses must be considered with extreme caution. The details
of the recruitment, sampling, and representativeness of the groups are
detailed in Bruter (2009). To summarize, it is well known that for
experimental purposes, samples need not be representative (Brannigan
2004); however, this study, although making no exception, used diver-
sified samples that ensured general sample balance in terms of gender,
age, education levels, and so on. Full-randomization tests were con-
ducted and showed no significant differences across groups. Tests also
were performed that confirmed no significant differences in experi-
mental effects across gender, social, and demographic groups. The
only exception is age: younger and older citizens proved slightly more
influenceable than other generations. Age and gender are included as
control variables in all equations.
The effect of news and symbols on European identity
over time
The specificity of our research design is twofold. First, it is related to
the sheer length of the experiment. Second, it allows a “cooling-off”
period of six months after the end of the experimental treatment, which
enabled us to assess the continued effect of systematic exposure to good
12 Moreover, the study includes three major players of European integration:
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).
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or bad news about Europe on the European identity of citizens well
after this exposure ceased. Our overall models included hypotheses
regarding the effects of both symbols of European integration (which
are expected to have a direct and accelerating effect on citizens’ identity
because respondents exposed to symbols of integration are primed to
notice them in their natural environment) and other hypotheses on the
effect of positive and negative news on Europe.
Hypotheses were tested that obeyed a double logic of time (in other
words, how the effect of an identity stimulus is likely to apply or decay
consciously under stimulation, or unconsciously, once stimulation is
over) (see Bruter 2009) and components (i.e., following Bruter’s 2005
empirical typology of self-expressed, civic and cultural components of
identity, which is likely to be most affected by which type of stimu-
lus). The result consisted of four hypotheses: good and bad news on
Europe have an effect on levels of European identity (H1), particu-
larly on its civic component (H1b); symbols of Europe and the EU
have an impact of European identity (H2), particularly on its cultural
component (H2b); symbols have an immediate effect, which then will
amplify over time (H3); and news has a “time-bomb” effect – that is,
no immediate effect but a strong effect post-lag (H4).
The hypotheses were tested using a series of ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions. In total, six models were tested in which the
dependent variables were general European identity at the end of the
twenty-four-month experimental treatment (model 1); general Euro-
pean identity again, after a six-month gap without experimental treat-
ment (model 2); civic European identity after the twenty-four-month
experimental treatment (model 3); again after the additional six-month
cooling-off period (model 4); and, finally, cultural European identity,
again after twenty-four months and again after thirty months (models
5 and 6). OLS was used because it assesses the effects of the stim-
uli in a straightforward and rigorous way while fully controlling for
pre-test levels of European identity, support for European integration,
and various social and demographic variables such as gender and age.
However, given existing debates in the literature, the models also were
run using generalized least squares (GLS)13 with entirely similar results
13 There is significant debate in the literature about how a panel effect is best
measured (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995; Hecock 2006). Here, there is no particular
reason to suspect heteroscedastic error, particularly considering the split starting
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and statistically significant variables. The regressions were run for the
entire sample, with country dummies, and then within each country.
Of course, it was signaled that country-specific regressions in particu-
lar had to be considered with caution because of the relatively limited
number of cases.
In the context of this chapter, we do not focus on the effect of sym-
bols of Europe on participants’ European identity but rather look only
at the model of news. However, because the effect of symbols was part
of the models, we briefly mention that news on Europe has a strong
effect on European identity, particularly on its cultural component
(although it also has a statistically significant effect on the sponta-
neous expression of European identity). This effect occurs during the
experimental phase but accelerates further in the six months that fol-
low the end of the experimental treatment, thereby suggesting that
respondents who are regularly exposed to EU symbols are effectively
primed to notice them more in their natural environment.
The effect of positive and negative news about Europe
As described previously, hypothesis H2 stated that positive and neg-
ative news on Europe will affect European identity, particularly its
civic component (H2b); whereas H4, which is grounded on a modi-
fied sleeper-effect theory (which would not be due to source-specific
idiosyncrasies but rather to an attribute of the citizens – namely, cyni-
cism), claimed that this effect will be delayed until after the lag that fol-
lows the end of the experiment. This hypothesis has significant implica-
tions for our understanding of the impact of political communication
on increasingly cynical citizens. First, the panel-study experiment con-
firmed that, over time, news on Europe has an impact on the European
identity of citizens. This effect is predominantly strong on the civic
component of European identity, but news on Europe also affects gen-
eral identity (Table 7.4). Cultural European identity is less influenced
by good and bad news about Europe and the EU, although some of the
dates for each group in each country. However, because only three time points
are included, to avoid any unnecessary methodological controversy, all of the
models also were tested using a generalized estimating equations extension of
GLS instead of OLS with full controls. The results were fully comparable with
the same variables appearing as statistically significant and important in the two
models.
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Table 7.4. Global impact of news and symbols at the end of the experiment and after the six-month lag
General identity Civic identity Cultural identity
t+24 t+30 t+24 t+30 t+24 t+30
b (s.e.) β b (s.e.) β b (s.e.) β b (s.e.) β b (s.e.) β b (s.e.) β
News 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 0.79 (0.06) 0.35∗∗ −0.15 (0.04) −0.07∗∗ 0.98 (0.06) 0.49∗∗ 0.07 (0.06) 0.03 0.21 (0.06) 0.11∗
Symbols 0.14 (0.05) 0.07∗∗ 0.28 (0.06) 0.13∗∗ 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 0.07 (0.06) 0.04 0.56 (0.06) 0.28∗∗ 1.01 (0.06) 0.51∗∗
Age −0.00 (0.00) −0.05∗ −0.00 (0.00) −0.01 −0.00 (0.00) −0.01 −0.00 (0.00) −0.02 −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 −0.00 (0.00) −0.03
Gender −0.11 (0.05) −0.02 −0.33 (0.06) −0.15∗∗ 0.09 (0.04) 0.04∗ −0.11 (0.06) −0.05 −0.10 (0.07) 0.05 −0.01 (0.06) −0.01
Pro-EU 0.17 (0.03) 0.15∗∗ 0.29 (0.04) 0.27∗∗ 0.10 (0.02) 0.10∗∗ 0.26 (0.03) 0.27∗∗ 0.11 (0.03) 0.11∗∗ 0.17 (0.03) 0.18∗∗
DV at t0 0.63 (0.02) 0.67
∗∗ 0.37 (0.03) 0.39∗∗ 0.69 (0.02) 0.72∗∗ 0.08 (0.03) 0.08 0.29 (0.03) 0.31∗∗ 0.18 (0.03) 0.20∗∗
France n.s. n.s. 0.35 (0.10) 0.13∗∗ n.s. n.s. 0.61 (0.10) 0.24∗∗ 0.23 (0.11) 0.09∗ n.s. n.s.
Sweden −0.22 (0.09) −0.07∗ n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. −0.40 (0.10) −0.15∗∗ n.s. n.s. −0.23 (0.11) −0.09∗
UK n.s. n.s. 0.26 (0.11) 0.09∗ n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Constant 1.66 (0.15) 2.32 (0.19) −0.07 (0.10) −0.48 (0.14) −0.16 (0.15) −0.51 (0.15)
R2 0.62 0.46 0.67 0.46 0.25 0.37
Notes: Results are OLS regression coefficients, with standard error in brackets.
∗ Statistically significant at  0.05; ∗∗ statistically significant at  0.01.
Country dummies were entered in the equation but only those that are statistically significant at 0.05 or better are shown. n.s. = non-significant. The omitted
category for the country dummies is Germany. n = 902 (t+24)) and 761 (t+30).
C
ore term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/C
B
O
9781139963343.010
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. London School of Econom
ics Lib, on 05 A
pr 2017 at 11:35:32, subject to the C
am
bridge
Media and identity 181
national subsamples (e.g., France and Portugal) show strong effects in
the context of the third wave (Table 7.5C).
The more complex and interesting finding, however, is related to the
modified sleeper-effect hypothesis, which confirms the subconscious –
some would say insidious – effect of news on European identity.
“Biased” good or bad news on Europe has virtually no effect on cit-
izens’ levels of European identity while they are being exposed to
it, as illustrated by Figure 7.1. Instead, the unmistakable news effect
becomes apparent only after some distance comes between the partic-
ipants and the systematically connoted news that they were exposed
to for two years. Therefore, it is during the months that follow the
reception of the last newsletter that the level of European identity of
citizens changes dramatically along the lines of the news to which they
were exposed. Moreover, when the news becomes effective after the
end of the experimental treatment, it is stronger than that of symbols
and that of all the control variables (including the respondent’s level
of European identity prior to the beginning of the experiment and
attitudes toward EU integration). By contrast, when the effect of news
on the identity of citizens is measured immediately after the experi-
mental treatment, it is virtually nonexistent overall. In a few countries
(e.g., France and Portugal), a mild effect exists, but it is nowhere
near the effect at t+30. However, by contrast, when it comes to the
British sample (with UK citizens being among the most cynical world-
wide overall), the effect of news on European identity even appears
to be negative (and statistically significant) at t+24, as if respondents
were trying to “counterbalance” the bias that constitutes the news they
were exposed to in the newsletter (Tables 7.5A and 7.5B). In this con-
text, we call particularly “cynical” those citizens who have a negative
response to the news stimulus immediately after being exposed to it
(i.e., those who feel less European at t+24 when they have been exposed
to positive news or feel more European at t+30 when they have been
exposed to negative news). For those cynical citizens, it is particularly
interesting and relevant to see that the effect then is reversed (in the
direction of the stimulus) at t+30.
The three-wave panel-study design proves beyond a doubt that the
ability of citizens to discount the bias of news on Europe at the time
they are being exposed to it does not in any way mean that European
citizens are globally immune to the influence of manipulative mass
media. Far from it – by the time the last questionnaire was administered
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Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
4.3
(a) GENERAL
(b) CIVIC
(c) CULTURAL
4.2
4.1
4
3.9
3.8
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.7
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
−0.1
−0.3
−0.4
−0.5
−0.6
−0.2
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
−0.1
−0.3
−0.4
−0.5
−0.6
−0.7
−0.2
STIMULUS
Negative News
Placebo
Negative News
Symbols
Positive News
Placebo
Positive News
Symbols
Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
3.65 (1.25) 3.83 (1.22) 4.28 (0.85)
3.60 (1.10) 3.65 (1.13) 3.97 (1.02)
3.72 (0.96) 3.99 (0.88) 3.71 (1.10)
3.75 (1.20) 3.80 (1.10) 3.36 (1.28)
STIMULUS
Negative News
Placebo
Negative News
Symbols
Positive News
Placebo
Positive News
Symbols
Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
−0.01 (1.09) −0.09 (1.07) 0.47 (0.69)
−0.01 (1.05) −0.21 (1.07) 0.36 (0.81)
0.01 (0.83) 0.15 (0.77) −0.36 (1.06)
0.07 (0.99) 0.24 (1.00) −0.56 (1.03)
STIMULUS
Negative News
Placebo
Negative News
Symbols
Positive News
Placebo
Positive News
Symbols
Pre-Test (t0) Post-Test (t+24) Post-Lag (t+30)
0.02 (0.95 0.13 (0.85) 0.39 (0.76)
−0.05 (0.88) −0.26 (0.91) −0.28 (0.85)
0.09 (0.97) 0.38 (0.92) 0.56 (0.71)
0.02 (1.14) 0.14 (1.00) −0.68 (1.11)
Figure 7.1. Evolution of European identity over time.
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Table 7.5. The impact of news and symbols on European identity by country
7.5A. General identity
UK France Germany Belgium Sweden Portugal
Wave 2 News –0.12∗ 0.20∗ –0.10 0.03 –0.12∗ 0.18∗∗
Symbols 0.02 0.08 0.24∗∗ 0.14 0.11∗ 0.11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.79
∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.79∗∗
R2 0.80 0.40 0.52 0.45 0.84 0.62
Wave 3 News 0.35∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.29∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 0.37∗∗
Symbols 0.11 0.12 0.22∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.06
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.54
∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.07 0.43∗∗ 0.38∗
R2 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.47 0.58 0.49
7.5B. Civic identity
UK France Germany Belgium Sweden Portugal
Wave 2 News –0.19∗∗ –0.13 –0.06 –0.11 0.01 –0.02
Symbols –0.04 –0.05 0.34∗∗ 0.05 0.09 0.05
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.80
∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.67∗∗
R2 0.78 0.38 0.52 0.20 0.86 0.78
Wave 3 News 0.29∗ 0.21∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.49∗∗
Symbols 0.13 0.20∗ 0.18 –0.02 –0.12 0.05
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.37
∗∗ –0.06 0.21
R2 0.16 0.34 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.56
7.5C. Cultural identity
UK France Germany Belgium Sweden Portugal
Wave 2 News 0.14 –0.02 –0.07 0.03 –0.08 0.16
Symbols 0.21∗ 0.16 0.25∗ 0.29∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.21∗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.44
∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.31∗∗ –0.20 0.61∗∗
R2 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.21 0.49 0.51
Wave 3 News 0.26 0.27∗ –0.04 –0.10 –0.08 0.28∗
Symbols 0.32∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.33∗∗
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Control t0 0.28 0.31
∗ 0.15 0.37∗∗ –0.24∗ 0.41∗∗
R2 0.13 0.36 0.44 0.71 0.70 0.49
Notes: Results are standardized OLS regression coefficients. ∗ Statistically significant at  0.05;
∗∗ statistically significant at  0.01. N (first figure for wave 2, second figure for wave 3) for 7.5A,
7.5B, and 7.5C:
– United Kingdom (A: 150, 118; B: 148, 116; C: 147, 116)
– France (A: 181, 154; B: 181, 146; C: 169, 138)
– Germany (A: 146, 118; B: 130, 114; C: 126, 114)
– Belgium (A: 171, 136; B: 147, 132; C: 148, 131)
– Sweden (A: 128, 128; B: 128, 127; C: 128, 127)
– Portugal (A: 124, 108; B: 124, 104; C: 124, 104)
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thirty months after the beginning of the experiment (at t+30), good or
bad news strongly influenced citizens’ identity. This very strong effect –
measured after the six-month clearing period that followed the end
of the twenty-four months of exposure to the experimental stimulus
(t+24) – is, in fact, of a magnitude that only can serve to remind us of
the ultimate power of political communication. This communication
effect – stronger than ever – radically influences citizens’ European
identity in a way that sharply contrasts with the limited immediate
impact of news that was measured at t+24. Indeed, this effect at t+30
is even strong among the British and Swedish samples in which citi-
zens originally showed high levels of resistance to what they read (see
Tables 7.5A and 7.5B). In fact, the “time-bomb” finding underlines
the fact that there is absolutely no contradiction between knowing
that someone is trying to manipulate you and trying to resist such
manipulation, on the one hand, and ultimately proving overwhelm-
ingly influenced by it. Increasingly sophisticated and cynical citizens
apparently may identify or even resist what they think of as biased
news and discount journalistic manipulation while exposed to it. Nev-
ertheless, on the other hand, they still show a genuine and significant
subconscious vulnerability to this bias when they stop being directly
confronted to the potentially manipulative news source (see Figures
7.1A and 7.1B). In other words, the “time-bomb” effect suggests that
although citizens have learned that the media are not objective and
may well have their own political agenda, this knowledge, which is
efficiently operational at the time news is received, does not prevent
the news from having an insidious effect, permeating the heart and
mind of citizens over time.
As mentioned previously, the proof that cynicism toward the media
does not equate to resistance to manipulation in the long term is shown
in the Swedish sample, which proves to be most effective at resisting
news effects at t+24 (indeed, a statistically significant negative effect)
before transforming into the most strongly affected sample by news at
t+30 (see Tables 7.5A and 7.5B). Even more generally, whereas news
on Europe has a strong lagged effect on citizens’ identity in every one
of the six national groups, the lower the effect at t+24, the higher
it seems to be at t+30. It is as if the harder citizens tried to “resist”
manipulation, the more vulnerable to it they ultimately proved. Thus,
the effect develops far more dramatically postexperimental treatment
in the Swedish and British cases than elsewhere. In those cases, news
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seemed to have a counterproductive effect at first but then a strong
positive effect later. In the French sample, however, the barrier of cyn-
icism is weaker at t+24, and good and bad news matter immediately.
Whereas it further accelerates later, its final impact is not as strong
as in the British and Swedish groups. By and large, however, by t+30,
the case remains that the long-term effect of news on civic identity is
nothing less than overwhelming. This proves that, ultimately, expos-
ing citizens to regular good news on Europe makes them feel more
European over time, whereas exposing them to the type of systematic
bad news typically found in the British tabloids is a veritable “identity
killer.”
Of course, this does not mean that the European Commission simply
could send a couple of pages of positive news on the EU every other
week and get people to feel overwhelmingly European. Indeed, neither
will exposing them to only negative news destroy the Europeanness
in anyone. In particular, the most interesting aspect of the translation
of our experimental findings into real-life situations is about what
will happen to the “immediate cynicism discount” that we observe at
t+24 for people who are consistently exposed to the same – positive or
negative – type of news, and whether the rarity of news on Europe is
enough to make this immediate discount irrelevant in real life.
Our strong measures of identity are probably significantly affected
only by our experimental stimulus to the extent that, in all likeli-
hood, after two years of intense information on Europe through the
experiments, the participants were probably exposed to more news on
Europe than the average European throughout an entire lifetime. In
this sense, identity is not proven to be more malleable than expected by
our findings. What the findings confirm, instead, is the scarcity of news
on Europe in the current media landscape and the scope for impact
of any potential genuine information on Europe (e.g., through civic
education).
Cynicism, politicization, identity, and the public sphere
The “time-bomb” effect highlighted in this chapter poses in an unusual
way the question of the relationship among the emergence of a Euro-
pean public sphere, the politicization of European politics, and the
emergence of a mass European identity. Clearly, politicization can
be dangerous, in that we found that, ultimately, a steady stream of
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bad news on Europe can negatively affect the European identity of
citizens – in particular, their civic identity that is most likely to result
in a sense of civic duty and allegiance. Conversely, good news on
Europe can significantly reinforce the European identity of citizens
(this was not obvious as such because much of the political communi-
cation literature suggests that, in many respects, bad news frequently
has more effect than good news). Even more important, it is unclear
whether in the absence of politicization of Europe – and, therefore,
of European news – any sense of identity would survive. Our recent
work shows that across the EU, levels of European identity are high
(see, e.g., Bruter and Harrison 2012, which presents the results of a
three-wave time-series study on European identity with a first wave
taking place in all twenty-seven member states of the EU with thirty
thousand respondents and additional waves in eight member states).
In fact, the levels are significantly higher than what has long been
assumed by the discipline in the absence of large-scale ad hoc mea-
sures. If this is true, it suggests that the emerging collective identity
of Europeans can survive the dangers of repeated negative news and
instead use the politicization of Europe to anchor citizens’ identity
on genuine European areas of political contestation. Moreover, if the
politicization of Europe is finally occurring and a genuine European
public sphere is partly emerging (see Part I), this may be a consequence
rather than a cause of a strengthening European identity. Journalists
are not known to willingly sacrifice space to questions that do not
interest their readers. So we must think of the full consequences of our
findings on the case of Europeanized public spheres. We know that
European integration is, by any standard, a regular focus of political
discussion across national public spheres and occasionally across a
Europeanized public sphere (e.g., in the context of the 2005 referenda
on the EU Constitution or in the context of the Greek financial crisis).
If our model suggests that discussion of polity-relevant political issues,
whether positive or negative, is a sign of appropriation of a political
system and therefore a sign of identity consolidation, then this is prob-
ably evidence that a European political identity has developed in its
own right to create a demand for the treatment of such topics.
The relationship among public sphere, politicization, cynicism, and
identity undoubtedly is complex and the ability of any actor – whether
institutional, political, or individual – to proactively control any of
these factors is extremely theoretical at the very least. There is,
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(a) Civic identity model
(b) Cultural identity model
Civic identity
post-lag
Civic identity
post-test
Civic identity
pre-test
News
0.72** 0.52**
0.49**−0.07**
−0.02
0.040.03
Symbols
Valid N = 829 (t+24), 740 (t+30)
N = 843, 732
Other controls included in the equation: age, sex, support for EU, country dummies
Cultural identity
two-month lag
Cultural identity
late-project
Cultural identity
pre-test
News
0.31** 0.53**
0.46**
0.05*0.03
0.04
0.28**
Symbols
Figure 7.2. Summary three-wave model.
however, little doubt that some underlying causal links are at stake and
that, for instance, the existence of a European public sphere or absence
thereof would have an impact on the dynamics of politicization expe-
rienced across the various EU member states. The likely shape of this
dynamic causality is partly illustrated by the fully developed models
of European civic and cultural identities over time (Figure 7.2(a) and
7.2(b)). These models deconstruct and distinguish how the immediate
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and lagged effects of news on Europe and EU symbols combine to
progressively affect identities. They also highlight how cultural iden-
tity (i.e., identification with a community) is more volatile than civic
identity (i.e., identification with a political system) in the long run,
which is a symbol of how entrenched the EU as a political system has
become in the political identity maps of Europeans.
Our findings show how the sophistication of citizens and their vul-
nerability to manipulation paradoxically go hand in hand in our highly
critical contemporary polities. When accused of influencing the pub-
lic, many think that such an accusation is illogical insofar as sophisti-
cated and cynical citizens will treat journalistic messages with a critical
eye that immunizes them against manipulation. Instead, we show that
even if British citizens effectively know that their mass media (and par-
ticularly tabloids) are globally Euroskeptic, this does not undermine
the ability of the media to make British citizens feel significantly less
European than others. Instead, the “time-bomb” effect suggests that
the very sophistication and cynicism of modern-day citizens might
well make them even more vulnerable to the influences to which they
think they are immune. Moreover, the principle of news self-selection
(Zaller 1992) hardly applies to the politicization of European inte-
gration because European coverage is most unlikely to constitute a
strong basis for news-outlet selection (unlike the general conservative/
liberal stance that Zaller predominantly considers in his work). Bias in
European coverage often is nationally entrenched rather than splitting
national media lines, which limits the ability of any citizen to select
news according to the level of “euro-sympathy” of media sources in
most cases.
Politicization is not so much a choice as a fatality and not so much a
cause as a consequence. In the context of the current crisis, we are wit-
nessing more debate about EU affairs and input than ever before. This
debate, however, is a natural consequence of the European political
system being integrated by citizens and being perceived as more rele-
vant and “real” than ever before. The existence of a European public
sphere that could channel the shape of European political debates into
centrifugal directions – whereas its absence would likely result in an
explosion of political fracture lines around communities – is key to the
likely nature of the news to which various subcategories of EU citizens
will be exposed. Therefore, according to our findings, it is the way this
news will shape their identities. As such, in a context of necessary and
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meaningful politicization, the convergence of national public spheres
into a European public pattern will have a significant impact on the
expression of political tensions that, in coming years, will continue
to oppose determined Euroskeptics to ever-more integrated European
citizens.
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